The leading case on the doctrine of common
purpose by way of active association is S v Safatsa 1988. In this case the
facts were the following: A crowd of about one hundred people attacked Y, who
was in his house, by pelting the house with stones, hurling petrol bombs
through the windows, catching him as he was fleeing from his burning house,
stoning him, pouring petrol over him and setting him alight. The six appellants
formed part of the crowd. The court found that their conduct consisted inter
alia of grabbing hold of Y, wrestling with him, throwing stones at him,
exhorting the crowd to kill him, forming part of the crowd which attacked him,
making petrol bombs, disarming him and setting his house alight.
In a
unanimous judgment delivered by Botha JA, the Appellate Division confirmed the
six appellants' convictions of murder by applying the doctrine of common
purpose, since it was clear that they all had had the common purpose to kill Y.
It was argued on behalf of the accused that they could be convicted of murder
only if a causal connection had been proved between each individual accused's
conduct and Y's death, but the court held that where, as in this case, a common
purpose to kill had been proved, each accused could be convicted of murder
without proof of a causal connection between each one's individual conduct and
Y's death. If there is no clear evidence that the participants had agreed
beforehand to commit the crime together, the existence of a common purpose
between a certain participant and the others may be proven by the fact that he actively associated himself with the
actions of the other members of the group.
Active association as proof of participation in a common
purpose
Existence
of a common purpose a participant and other members of group may be based on
finding that participant actively associated with actions of other members of
group. In Mgedezi 1989 Appellate Division held that, if there is no proof of a previous agreement between perpetrators,
an accused whose individual act is not
causally related to Y's death can only be convicted of murder on strength of
the doctrine of common purpose if five
requirements have been complied with:
. he
must have been present at the scene
of the crime
. he
must have been aware of the assault
on Y
. he
must have intended to make common cause
with those committing assault
. he
must have manifested his sharing of a
common purpose by himself
performing some act of association with
the conduct of the others
. he
must have intention to kill Y or to contribute to his death
Somebody
who was a passive spectator of
events will not terms of this doctrine, be liable to conviction even though he
may have been present at scene of action.
For X to have a common purpose with others to commit murder
it is not necessary that his intention to kill be present in the form
of dolus directus - dolus eventualis – he foresees the possibility that the acts
of participants with whom he associates himself may result in Y's death, and reconciles himself to this possibility - is enough for liability
S v Williams 1980. X1,
X2, X3, and X4 on train. X1 stabbed Y with knife, X2 went and held Y by neck
and X3 stabbed Y with broken bottle and X4 watched. X1 and X3 charged with
murder and X2 and X4 charged as accomplices.
X2 and X4 appealed. X4 was spectator and his appeal was upheld. X2
appeal against conviction was not upheld. Controversial that X2 was convicted
as accomplice and not co-perpetrator. His conduct complied with definition of
crime of murder can a person further death of victim without also causing it?
You must know what
objection is to convicting a person of being an accomplice (as opposed to
co-perpetrator) to murder. In Williams case it was accepted that a person
can be an accomplice to murder, but this aspect of judgment has been criticised
by Snyman (Criminal Law). You must
ensure that you know what the criticism is.
Snyman is of opinion that it is not possible to be an
accomplice to murder.
Is it possible to further victim’s death without
also causing it? Appelate court in Williams case accepted that person may be
accomplice to murder and held that one of the accused was guilty as accomplice
to murder. Snyman feel decision incorrect because the person accused as
accomplice was the cause of death of victim and should have been convicted as
co-perpetrator. Certain legal writers are of view that it is impossible to be
accomplice to murder while others accept possibility of this form of liability.
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